Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition "restricted deceptionproofness." It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought. JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.
Introduction
The conditions for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies are typically viewed as very permissive. 1 For example, in a standard Bayesian environment with incomplete information in which type spaces are common knowledge, Abreu and Matsushima (1992) [AM, henceforth] show that both incentive compatibility and their measurability condition (which we shall refer to as AM measurability from now on) are necessary for (exact or approximate) implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Incentive compatibility is the central restriction in the economic theory of information, and it can sometimes be quite demanding. However, as argued for instance in AM or in Serrano and Vohra (2005) , AM measurability is usually very weak: interim preferences of the different types are almost always distinct from each other, and then, AM measurability amounts to no restriction at all. These necessity results are generalized to robust environments, in which weaker common knowledge requirements are made, in Bergemann and Morris (2009a) [BM from now on] and in Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano (2009) [AKS in the sequel]. 2 In the three papers afore mentioned (AM, BM and AKS), additional conditions are used to prove the corresponding sufficiency results. AM's Assumption 2 states that, for each agent i and each state, there exist two ex-post lotteries that i ranks strictly, and for which all other agents have the (weakly) opposite preferences. BM make use of an economic assumption, which is essentially a robust analogue of AM's Assumption 2. Due to their robustness considerations, BM need the assumption that for each agent i, there exists a constant lottery z i that i strictly prefers to the uniform lotterȳ y, and for which all other agents have the (weakly) opposite preferences, "regardless of the underlying payoff types." Finally, AKS assume directly the existence of quasilinear preferences over a numeraire. In all three cases, the use of these assumptions in the sufficiency proofs is seemingly minor, in order to allow infinitesimal punishments out of equilibrium. Thus, one might have thought that such conditions could be dispensed with and that new proofs of the authors' sufficiency results could be engineered without the aid of such assumptions. In this paper, we show that such a hope is misplaced. Indeed, such assumptions cannot be dropped because a new necessary condition that the literature had overlooked must be added.
We identify such a condition, and we term it restricted deception-proofness. It says that in environments in which preferences are identical across agents, the social choice function (SCF) must be immune to all manipulations via deceptions. As such, the condition is then stronger than incentive compatibility and sometimes strictly so, leading to a new restriction on the SCFs that can be (exactly or approximately) implementable in iteratively undominated strategies. Considered by itself, restricted deception-proofness can be substantially more restrictive than AM measurability or the conditions of virtual monotonicity and its mixed counterpart (the latter two found in Vohra (2005, 2009) ). We shall provide an example, which has appeared previously in the literature, to illustrate our points. We close by noting that we study incomplete information environments; two papers containing some related results for the complete information domain are Börgers (1995) and Bergemann and Morris (2009b) . Bergemann and Morris (2009b) show a similar result for virtual implementation under complete information. Börgers (1995) obtains some impossibility result under complete information when only deterministic mechanisms are allowed and all possible identical preferences are included as part of the domain.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and Θ i be the set of finite types of agent i. Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be independent of the information state. For simplicity, suppose A = {a 1 , . . . , a K } is finite. Let Δ(A) denote the set of probability distributions on A.
We can now define an environment as E = (A, {u i , Θ i , q i } i∈N ), which is implicitly understood to be common knowledge among the agents.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ → Δ(A). The interim expected utility of agent i of type θ i that pretends to be of type θ i corresponding to an SCF f is defined as:
denote a (pure) strategy for agent i and Σ i his set of pure strategies. Let
Given a mechanism Γ = (M, g), let H i be a subset of Σ i .
3 Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
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Definition 1 (Strict Dominance) A strategy σ i ∈ H i is strictly dominated for player i with respect to
Let K i (H) denote the set of all undominated strategies for agent i with
Definition 3 (Exact Implementability) An SCF f is said to be exactly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies if there exists a mechanism
Consider the following metric on SCFs:
The notation f (θ|a) refers to the probability with which f implements a ∈ A in the state θ. The next standard definition is very important in the entire economic theory of information:
As is well-known (e.g., see AM (1992)), the next proposition identifies incentive compatibility as a necessary condition for implementability:
Proposition 1 (AM (1992)) If an SCF f is either exactly or approximately implementable in iteratively undominated strategies, then it satisfies incentive compatibility.
For the next definition we require some more notation. Let Ψ −i be a partition of Θ −i . Say that θ i is equivalent to θ i with respect to Ψ −i when agent i's interim expected utility under type θ i is exactly the same as under type θ i when evaluating any SCF that is measurable with respect to Θ i ×Ψ −i .
Let ρ i (θ i , Ψ −i ) be the set of all elements of Θ i that are equivalent to θ i with respect to Ψ −i , and let
Note that R i (Ψ −i ) forms an equivalence class on Θ i , that is, it constitutes a partition of Θ i . We define an infinite sequence of n-tuples of partitions,
, where Ψ h = × i∈N Ψ h i in the following way. For every i ∈ N ,
and recursively, for every i ∈ N and every h ≥ 1,
is the same as, or finer than, Ψ h i . Define Ψ * as follows:
Definition 6 (AM Measurability) An SCF f is said to satisfy AM-measurability if it is measurable with respect to Ψ * .
The following result is also shown in AM (1992):
Proposition 2 (AM (1992)) If an SCF f is either exactly or approximately implementable in iteratively undominated strategies, then it satisfies AMmeasurability.
To easily check AM-measurability, it is often possible to finish the algorithm in the first iteration. When this happens, we say that the environment satisfies type diversity. To define this condition, recall that A = {a 1 , . . . , a K }. Henceforth, we will find it convenient to identify a lottery x ∈ Δ(A) as a point in the (K − 1) dimensional unit simplex 
where e is the unit vector in Δ K−1 .
Clearly, under type diversity, the measurability algorithm stops after the first iteration, leading to the finest partion possible -all types are separated. As a result, all SCFs satisfy AM-measurability.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to well behaved mechanisms where best responses are always well defined. The next definitions are borrowed from AM (1992):
For every i ∈ N and every partition Ψ i , let Σ i (Ψ i ) denote the set of mixed strategies of player i that are measurable with respect to Ψ i .
Definition 8
The profile σ ∈ Σ 1 (Ψ 1 )×· · ·×Σ n (Ψ n ) is a pseudo-Bayesian equilibrium with respect to Ψ if for all i ∈ N and all ψ i ∈ Ψ i , there exists some θ i with θ i ∈ ψ i such that
Definition 9 (Regular Mechanisms) A mechanism Γ is said to be regular if, for each Ψ, there exists a pseudo-Bayesian equilibrium with respect to Ψ.
In particular, finite mechanisms -like the ones constructed in AKS, AM, and BM -are regular. Mechanisms that rely on the use of integer games are not regular. More importantly, Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2010) do employ such non-regular mechanisms for their sufficiency result.
Restricted Deception-Proofness
This section introduces a new property of SCFs and contains our main result.
Let F be the set of all SCFs.
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Definition 10 (Strategically Identical Preferences) An environment E satisfies strategically identical preferences at the set of types Θ 0 and the admissible class of mechanismsΓ if the following four properties are satisfied:
This definition says that, for each agent there exists a set of types Θ 0 that is exactly the same across agents. Moreover, the event consisting of the n-fold Cartesian product of Θ 0 is common knowledge among all agents. In particular, for each type θ 0 ∈ Θ 0 , interim preferences are identical across agents. Finally, interim preferences may differ across different types in Θ 0 , but, as in a pure coordination game, for any mechanism these agents could play within a certain class, there always exists a strategy profile that yields an outcome that is placed at the top of every type's interim preferences, a "common top property" for all types θ 0 within Θ 0 . This last property can be automatically satisfied if we consider regular mechanisms.
A deception is a profile of functions, α = (α i ) i∈N , where
(Note that the identity function I on Θ is not a deception.) For an SCF f and a deception α, f • α denotes the SCF such that for each θ ∈ Θ, [f • α](θ) = f (α(θ)). Let A be the set of all deceptions union with the identity function on Θ.
The following is the main definition of this paper:
Definition 11 (Restricted Deception-Proofness) An SCF f satisfies the restricted deception-proofness property if, whenever an environment E satisfies strategically identical preferences at Θ 0 and the direct mechanism for f , it follows that
Restricted deception-proofness means that, whenever the environment contains an informational event with strategically identical preferences over the strategic situation described by the SCF's direct mechanism, the SCF has a "common top" property for all types of all agents. Indeed, among all 7 working papers series possible manipulations of the SCF, embodied by all deceptions, no type of any agent would like to use that coordinated effort to depart from truthtelling. We shall illustrate the definition in the next section.
We next present our main result:
Proposition 3
If an SCF f is exactly implementable by a regular mechanism in iteratively undominated strategies, it satisfies restricted deceptionproofness.
Proof: Let Γ = (M, g) be an implementing mechanism that is regular. Let F Γ be the set of SCFs associated with Γ. That is,
Since the implementing mechanism Γ is regular, property (4) of the definition of strategically identical preferences is satisfied for Γ. By our hypothesis of restricted deception-proofness, we consider an environment satisfying strategically identical preferences at Θ 0 and the mechanism Γ. In what follows, we need the following notation:
Note that the non-emptyness of H Γ,Θ 0 andΣ 
We proceed by induction. According to the induction hypothesis, suppose thatΣ Γ,Θ 0 ⊂ K k Θ 0 (Σ). Fix agent i arbitrarily. Our induction hypothesis guarantees thatΣ
arbitrarily. By the induction hypothesis,σ i is undominated with respect to [K k Θ 0 (Σ)] −i . And combining the strategically identical preferences assumption and the induction hypothesis, for any θ 0 ∈ Θ 0 , there existŝ
Since f is implementable in iteratively undominated strategies, we have that
In particular, this implies that f ∈ H Γ,Θ 0 , and hence
Here, the last inequality follows because the set F Γ contains the set of SCFs associated with the direct mechanism for f (i.e., f itself union with the set of f • α for all deceptions α). Thus, f satisfies restricted deception-proofness. This completes the proof. .
The next result is a simple, but important extension of the previous one:
Proposition 4 If an SCF f is approximately implementable by a regular mechanism in iteratively undominated strategies, it satisfies restricted deception-proofness.
Proof: Let Γ ε = ((M i ) i∈N , g ε ) denote the implementing regular mechanism when the approximation is ε > 0. Fixε to be small enough and consider the class of mechanismsΓ = 0≤ε≤ε Γ ε . Define
By our hypothesis of restricted deception-proofness, we consider an environment satisfying strategically identical preferences at Θ 0 and at the class of mechanismsΓ.
For each ε ≤ε, let
Once again, the non-emptyness of H Γε,Θ 0 andΣ , respectively. With the definitions so adapted, the rest of the proof proceeds as the proof of the previous proposition.
Discussion
At this point it will be useful to consider an example that first appeared in Palfrey and Srivastava (1989, Example 3) and that was extensively analyzed in Serrano and Vohra (2005, Section 5 ).
There are two alternatives, A = {a, b} and three agents. Each agent has two possible types, Θ i = {θ a , θ b } and each type is drawn independently with q i (θ b ) = q for all i and q 2 > 0.5. Agents have identical preferences, given by For each agent, the corresponding interim utilities for the constant SCFs assigning alternatives a and b are:
Since q 2 > 0.5, this implies that U b i (θ i ) > U a i (θ i ) for all i and θ i ∈ Θ i . Using this, it can be checked that in this environment, only constant SCFs satisfy AM-measurability. On the other hand, as argued in Serrano and Vohra (2005) , all SCFs satisfy virtual monotonicity, a necessary condition for approximate implementation in Bayesian equilibrium. Furthermore, appealing to the results in Serrano and Vohra (2009) , all SCFs in this environment also satisfy mixed virtual monotonicity. It follows that all SCFs that are incentive compatible are approximately implementable in (mixed) Bayesian equilibrium. However, since AM-measurability is necessary for implementation in regular mechanisms, we know that the implementing mechanism in Bayesian equilibrium must involve the use of integer games or devices alike.
For us, what is more interesting now is the modification of the example by adding a third alternative c, which for instance gives a zero payoff
